Guilt by Design: Structuring Organizations to Elicit Guilt as an Affective Reaction to Failure by Bohns, Vanessa K & Flynn, Francis K
Cornell University ILR School 
DigitalCommons@ILR 
Articles and Chapters ILR Collection 
2012 
Guilt by Design: Structuring Organizations to Elicit Guilt as an 
Affective Reaction to Failure 
Vanessa K. Bohns 
Cornell University, vkb2@cornell.edu 
Francis K. Flynn 
Stanford University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/articles 
 Part of the Industrial and Organizational Psychology Commons, Labor Relations Commons, 
Organizational Behavior and Theory Commons, Organization Development Commons, and the Work, 
Economy and Organizations Commons 
Thank you for downloading an article from DigitalCommons@ILR. 
Support this valuable resource today! 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the ILR Collection at DigitalCommons@ILR. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Articles and Chapters by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@ILR. For more 
information, please contact catherwood-dig@cornell.edu. 
If you have a disability and are having trouble accessing information on this website or need materials in an 
alternate format, contact web-accessibility@cornell.edu for assistance. 
Guilt by Design: Structuring Organizations to Elicit Guilt as an Affective Reaction 
to Failure 
Abstract 
In this article, we outline a model of how organizations can effectively shape employees’ affective 
reactions to failure. We do not suggest that organizations eliminate the experience of negative affect 
following performance failures—instead, we propose that they encourage a more constructive form of 
negative affect (guilt) instead of a destructive one (shame). We argue that guilt responses prompt 
employees to take corrective action in response to mistakes, while shame responses are likely to elicit 
more detrimental effects of negative affect. Further, we suggest that organizations can play a role in 
influencing employees’ discrete emotional reactions to the benefit of both employees and the 
organization. We describe the necessary antecedents for encouraging guilt responses without 
simultaneously eliciting shame. Essentially, employees are more likely to experience guilt (but not shame) 
if they feel they had control over a specific negative event and the event resulted in a negative outcome 
for others. Given these necessary preconditions, we identify a set of organizational 
characteristics—autonomy, specificity of performance feedback, and outcome interdependence—that can 
be modified to make the experience of guilt more likely than that of shame in the workplace. The ethical 
and practical limits of shaping employees’ emotional experiences within a negative affective domain are 
also addressed. 
Keywords 
affect, emotions, guilt, job design, job performance 
Disciplines 
Industrial and Organizational Psychology | Labor Relations | Organizational Behavior and Theory | 
Organization Development | Work, Economy and Organizations 
Comments 
Required Publisher Statement 
© INFORMS. Final version published as: Bohns, V. K., & Flynn, F. J. (2012). Guilt by design: Structuring 
organizations to elicit guilt as an affective reaction to failure. Organization Science, 24(4), 1157-1173. 
Reprinted with permission. All rights reserved. 
Suggested Citation 
Bohns, V. K., & Flynn, F. J. (2012). Guilt by design: Structuring organizations to elicit guilt as an affective 
reaction to failure[Electronic version]. Retrieved [insert date], from Cornell University, ILR School site: 
http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/articles/1056 
This article is available at DigitalCommons@ILR: https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/articles/1056 
Keywords: Affect; Emotions; Guilt; Job Design; Job Performance 
 
Guilt by Design: Structuring Organizations to Elicit Guilt as an Affective Reaction to Failure  
Vanessa K. Bohns, University of Waterloo 
Francis J. Flynn, Stanford University 
 
Published in Organization Science 
 
Abstract 
In this article, we outline a model of how organizations can effectively shape employees’ affective 
reactions to failure. We do not suggest that organizations eliminate the experience of negative affect 
following performance failures—instead, we propose that they encourage a more constructive form of 
negative affect (guilt) instead of a destructive one (shame). We argue that guilt responses prompt 
employees to take corrective action in response to mistakes, while shame responses are likely to elicit 
more detrimental effects of negative affect. Further, we suggest that organizations can play a role in 
influencing employees’ discrete emotional reactions to the benefit of both employees and the 
organization. We describe the necessary antecedents for encouraging guilt responses without 
simultaneously eliciting shame. Essentially, employees are more likely to experience guilt (but not 
shame) if they feel they had control over a specific negative event and the event resulted in a negative 
outcome for others. Given these necessary preconditions, we identify a set of organizational 
characteristics—autonomy, specificity of performance feedback, and outcome interdependence—that can 
be modified to make the experience of guilt more likely than that of shame in the workplace. The ethical 
and practical limits of shaping employees’ emotional experiences within a negative affective domain are 
also addressed. 
Acknowledgements  
We would like to thank Stéphane Côté and Sanford DeVoe for their helpful comments. 
 
Corresponding Author: 
Vanessa K. Bohns 
Department of Management Sciences 
University of Waterloo 
200 University Avenue West 
Waterloo, Ontario, Canada N2L 3G1  
vbohns@uwaterloo.ca 
 
Guilt by Design 2 
Guilt by Design: Structuring Organizations to Elicit Guilt as an Affective Reaction to Failure  
When employees fail to perform their tasks, or perform them poorly, they typically experience a 
form of negative emotion (e.g., Carver & Scheier 1990). Some of these negative emotions may be 
adaptive and some maladaptive. In particular, guilt is an adaptive affective response to failure, and shame 
is not.  Though related, guilt and shame have important distinctions. Shame tends to be associated with 
destructive actions, such as withdrawal, hostility, and resistance (Dickerson, Gruenewald & Kemeny 
2004; Tangney, 1991; Tangney, Wagner, Fletcher & Gramzow 1992), whereas guilt tends to inspire more 
constructive actions, such as engagement, apologizing, and reparation (Tangney, 1991; Tangney & 
Dearing, 2002; Tangney, Wagner, Fletcher & Gramzow 1992). In this article, we outline a model of how 
organizations can shape employees’ discrete affective reactions to performance failure.  Specifically, we 
posit that several workplace features should be enhanced not to avoid negative affect, but rather to 
promote a specific form of negative affect that tends to be constructive (guilt) without simultaneously 
fostering another form of negative affect that tends to be destructive (shame).  
Conventional wisdom suggests that organizations should avoid making their employees feel bad. 
However, it is unrealistic to expect employees to feel good in response to performance failure. Noting 
this, organizations must be concerned with the relative impact that discrete negative emotions can have on 
an employee’s subsequent motivation and performance. We argue that feeling guilty in response to 
performance failures at work is far superior to feeling ashamed.  Shame leads people to make attributions 
about their core abilities that can sabotage their motivation to correct mistakes and undermine their 
confidence to make subsequent improvements. Conversely, employees who feel guilty are more likely to 
identify the exact maladaptive behaviors that led to poor performance outcomes than to blame stable, 
unfavorable attributes of themselves (e.g., Lewis 1971; Tangney, Stuewig, & Mashek 2007; Tracy & 
Robins 2006).  Although both feelings are unpleasant, guilt is less demoralizing than shame, and thus, 
guilt is more likely to inspire employees to rectify their mistakes rather than dwelling on them or reacting 
in other unconstructive ways (Leith & Baumeister 1998).   
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To some extent, the advantages offered by guilt over shame in reacting to setbacks have been 
documented by previous research on individual differences in guilt- and shame-proneness (e.g., Tangney 
& Dearing 2002). It is therefore a relatively small leap to suggest that such advantages may exist in the 
professional domain. A more significant theoretical issue is how environmental characteristics—
particularly job characteristics—can influence the likelihood that someone will experience guilt instead of 
shame in response to a negative event.  Work environments may have a large impact on employee 
reactions to performance failure by influencing employees’ cognitive appraisals of events, which, in turn, 
produce discrete emotional responses (e.g., Elfenbein 2007; Haidt 2003; James 1884; Pizarro & Bloom 
2003; Roseman 1991; Schachter & Singer 1962). As Haidt (2003) pointed out, “changing the facts of the 
situation” can dramatically alter a person’s emotional response to that situation (p. 197). Along a similar 
vein, we propose that the extent to which employees label an emotion as “guilt” more so than “shame” 
can be shaped by characteristics of the work environment.  
We outline a theory of how employees’ negative reactions to failure can be modified so that they 
are less debilitating (although not necessarily less negative). Drawing from past research in clinical, 
social, and organizational psychology, we first provide a general overview of the relationship and the 
established differences between guilt and shame. We then present the case for how promoting guilt over 
shame reactions in response to performance failures at work can be advantageous for both individual 
employees and organizations. We go on to describe the necessary antecedents for guilt: employees are 
likely to experience guilt if they feel they had control over a specific negative event that resulted in a 
negative outcome for others (in contrast, employees who experience a negative event as pervasive and 
causing negative outcomes for themselves are likely to experience shame). Given these preconditions, we 
identify a set of organizational characteristics—namely, autonomy, specificity of performance feedback, 
and outcome interdependence—that can increase the likelihood that employees will experience guilt 
without simultaneously increasing the likelihood that they will experience shame.  We conclude by 
discussing the implications of these ideas and highlighting the importance of investigating discrete 
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emotions at work.  Finally, we address the ethical and practical limits of shaping employees’ emotional 
experiences, especially forms of negative affect.   
Guilt and Shame 
Guilt and shame are common affective reactions to committing transgressions—either doing 
something one should not have done or, conversely, having not done something one should have done 
(Tangney 1991). In fact, guilt and shame share many similarities. Neither is considered a “basic” emotion 
(e.g., sadness, joy, disgust); rather, both belong to a smaller category of affective experience known as 
“self-conscious” emotions (e.g., Tangney & Dearing 2002; Tracy & Robins 2006). Self-conscious 
emotions entail self-evaluation, or a comparison of one’s current state to some desired state (Tracy & 
Robins 2006). More specifically, guilt and shame are negative self-conscious emotions—“dysphoric 
experiences that involve a negative evaluation of the self or the self’s behavior” (Tangney, 1990, p. 105).  
Due to the similarities between guilt and shame, people who tend to experience one also tend to 
experience the other, as indicated by positive correlations in individual-difference measures of guilt- and 
shame-proneness ranging from .43 to .48 (Tangney, 1990).  It is also not uncommon for an individual to 
feel both shame and guilt in response to the same event.  For example, an individual transgressor may 
initially experience shame in response to a mistake he or she has made, but this response may eventually 
morph into a guilt response as the transgression is recalled and reinterpreted (Lewis, 1971). As Tangney 
(1990) explains, “one would expect shared variance reflecting the features shared by shame and guilt” (p. 
105). Nevertheless, there is also “substantial, meaningful unique variance, reflecting the critical 
differences between shame and guilt” (Tangney 1990, p. 105).     
Despite their similarities, guilt and shame are distinct emotional experiences with dramatically 
different consequences, especially in regard to social functioning (Baumeister, Stillwell, & Heatherton 
1994; Haidt 2003; Tangney & Dearing 2002). People who are guilt-prone tend to be both empathic 
(George 1991; Leith & Baumeister 1998; Tangney 1990; 1991) and averse to disappointing others 
(Horney 1937). Moreover, guilt-proneness is negatively related to Machiavellianism, or the tendency to 
manipulate others for personal gain (Wastell & Booth 2003), and is negatively related to the desire for 
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power and hedonism (Silfver, Helkama, Lonngvist & Verkasalo 2008). Further, feelings of guilt motivate 
a person to confess, apologize, and atone for their past miscues, rather than deny culpability or displace 
blame onto others (Lewis 1971; Tangney & Dearing 2002; Tangney et al. 1996).  As a result of these 
prosocial qualities, feeling guilty has been shown to lead to higher levels of helping (Cunningham, 
Steinberg, & Grev 1980; Freedman, Wallington, & Bless 1967; Konecni 1972; Lindsey, Yun & Hill 
2007)—similar to levels of helping driven by positive mood, albeit with differing motivation 
(Cunningham, Steinberg, & Grev 1980). Likewise, guilt has been associated with increased intentions to 
donate resources to those in need (Basil, Ridgway & Basil 2008) and to cooperate in social bargaining 
games (de Hooge, Zeelenberg, & Breugelmans 2007; Ketelaar & Au 2003). 
In contrast, the affective experience of shame correlates with negative social functioning.  Shame 
can debilitate individuals by making them feel powerless and worthless.  Evidence suggests that such 
demoralizing beliefs result in two primary maladaptive reactions.  First, while guilt is associated with a 
desire to proactively repair a bad situation, shame is associated with an impulse to disappear or hide 
(Tangney et al. 1996). One consequence of this “desire to hide or escape from interpersonal situations” 
(Tangney 1991, p. 599) is that shame-prone individuals are more likely to avoid than confront a problem. 
Second, although feelings of shame and guilt were once both thought to repress hostility (e.g., Ausubel 
1955), recent research has shown that shame (but not guilt) is associated with increased levels of 
aggression.  For example shame-prone individuals tend to exhibit less adaptive responses to frustrating 
events, including expressions of resentment, suspiciousness, and blaming others (Tangney 1991).  
Although seemingly incompatible, these two shame responses—hiding and lashing out—likely create a 
positive feedback loop of frustration and aggression.  An ashamed individual lashes out in a “humiliated 
fury,” and then “recognizes this humiliated fury as inappropriate or unjust” (Lewis 1987). This 
recognition may lead to further shame, which, in turn, leads to more hiding (Tangney 1992, p. 670). Leith 
and Baumeister (1998) provide a disheartening summary of the dysfunctional effects of shame: “the only 
resources that seem to minimize the subjective distress of shame are to ignore the problem, to deny one’s 
responsibility, to avoid other people, or perhaps to lash out at one’s accusers” (p. 4).  
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Guilt and Shame in the Workplace: Motivation and Performance in Response to Failure 
Guilt is more functional than shame, in general, but why should organizations, in particular, be 
interested in the distinction between these two emotions?  Self-conscious emotions, such as guilt and 
shame, entail self-evaluation, or a comparison of one’s current state to some desired state (Tracy & 
Robins 2006).  This quality of self-conscious emotions makes them particularly relevant to understanding 
motivation and performance within achievement and work domains, which regularly require individuals 
to assess their progress toward some goal or set of objectives (e.g., Seo, Feldman Barrett & Bartunek 
2004; Stipek 1995; Weiner 1985).  Thus, guilt may provide specific advantages over shame in terms of 
employee motivation and performance.   
We argue that organizations may benefit from the distinct proactive and prosocial qualities of 
guilt. Guilt promotes taking action while shame promotes avoiding action; relatedly, employees who are 
proactive rather than avoidant are likely to respond more effectively to performance failures. As for its 
prosocial qualities, guilt “stimulates attachment behavior such as in-group loyalty” (Baumeister et al. 
1994, p. 250) and functions “to repair damage to a relationship arising from a transgression” (p. 257). In 
organizations, performance failures may qualify as “transgressions against the group”—whether the 
“group” is the organization, one’s department, or one’s closest colleagues. To the extent that employees 
believe a personal transgression harms their “in-group,” they will likely experience guilt and attempt to 
rectify any harm done to fellow group members.  Overall, then, while an employee may feel both guilt 
and shame in the face of failure, he or she should demonstrate higher levels of motivation and 
performance when feeling guilt rather than shame.  
Guilt’s Influence on Employee Motivation and Performance 
Previous work on the influence of emotion on motivation and performance has highlighted 
positive affect as a determinant of task effort and motivational intensity (Seo, Feldman Barrett, & 
Bartunek 2004). For example, George and Brief (1996) find that positive affect leads to increased 
expectancy (through self-efficacy) and utility (through optimism) (see also Lyubomirsky, King, & Diener 
2005). Analogous arguments by Wright and Staw (1999) use goal-setting theory to show how positive 
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affect leads individuals to set higher goals that in turn lead to greater performance, and attribution models 
of motivation to show that individuals in a good mood are less likely to blame themselves for failures, 
attributing those failures instead to external causes that are less incapacitating. Wright and Staw (1999) 
further suggest that the link between positive affect and performance might be driven by interpersonal 
factors: because happy people are more attractive to others, they are more likely to receive positive peer 
evaluations, to be chosen as team members and leaders, and to receive help with tasks.   
Some of the theoretical accounts that link positive affect to increased motivation and performance 
(Wright & Staw 1999) may be useful as analogies for understanding the role of guilt in explaining the 
same employee outcomes. For example, like positive affect, guilt is associated with heightened 
confidence and self-efficacy (e.g., Covert, Tangney, Maddux, & Heleno 2003; Tangney 1995), which 
should lead to judgments of greater expectancy and utility (in Vroom’s [1964] model of motivation) as 
well as higher aspirations (in goal-setting theory). As mentioned earlier, experiences of guilt also tend not 
to elicit stable, global attributions of incompetence or worthlessness in response to failure—responses that 
can lead to incapacitating self-blame and impaired performance in the face of difficult obstacles (Tracy & 
Robins 2006). Finally, guilt-prone individuals, like happy individuals, tend to be well-liked, and 
dispositional guilt has generally been associated with more favorable interpersonal outcomes (Tangney & 
Dearing 2002).  In the work domain, these interpersonal outcomes may include the same advantages 
provided by positive affect in terms of receiving help, opportunities, and positive peer ratings that in turn 
translate into improved performance.  
Recent empirical research on individual differences in guilt-proneness further supports the link 
between guilt and increased levels of motivation and performance.  In both a field study and a laboratory 
setting, Flynn and Schaumberg (2012) found that higher levels of guilt-proneness were associated with 
greater task effort (e.g., time spent working). In short, guilt-prone people worked harder than their less 
guilt-prone counterparts. The researchers explained their findings based on highly guilt-prone individuals’ 
motivation to avoid disappointing others, which translates into greater concern with repairing past 
mistakes and avoiding future miscues.  This preliminary empirical evidence, along with several 
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theoretical arguments for how emotions can be translated into work motivation and performance, leads us 
to posit that feelings of guilt will have a positive impact on individual motivation and performance. 
 
Proposition 1: Feelings of guilt following performance failure will be associated with increased 
employee motivation and performance. 
 
Shame’s Influence on Employee Motivation and Performance 
Although guilt resulting from a performance failure will likely lead to increased employee 
motivation and performance, the case of shame is quite different. Guilt prompts individuals toward 
outward-focused action that addresses the source of the negative affect. However, shame triggers an 
inward focus (Lewis 1971) on the self that leads individuals to make global and stable attributions for 
their errors.  Rather than focusing on a particular behavior and its consequent outcome (“I did a horrible 
thing”), an individual experiencing shame is more likely to focus on the self (“I did a horrible thing”).  
This general attribution to the self may lead an individual to disengage from difficult tasks, rather than 
putting in additional effort to meet a challenge.  For example, he or she might think, “If that’s just the way 
I am, no amount of effort can change that” (cf. Mueller & Dweck 1988). 
Such attributions can lead an individual to feel incompetent and inadequate (Tangney et al. 1992).  
Given a sense of low self-worth, shame-ridden individuals may begin to doubt whether they are capable 
of performing their assigned tasks. In motivational terms, such feelings of self-doubt may undermine their 
performance through decreased self-efficacy and expectancy (Covert, Tangney, Maddux, Heleno 2003; 
Vroom 1964).  In behavioral terms, the pain of feeling incompetent may lead individuals experiencing 
shame to abandon tasks that have been performed incorrectly, without attempting to fix them, in an 
attempt to escape from the shame-inducing situation (Tangney et al. 1996).  For example, the most 
commonly used shame-proneness scale asks respondents what they would do if they broke something at 
work and then hid it.  Highly shame-prone individuals say they would be more likely to “think about 
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quitting” (Tangney, Wagner & Gramzow 1989), a clear indication of trying to hide from, rather than fix, a 
mistake.    
The affective experience of shame is associated with feelings of frustration and aggression 
(Tangney et al. 1992; 1996), which can directly undermine individual work performance (McColl-
Kennedy & Anderson 2002; Pearce & Porter 1996; Spector 1975).  Such feelings can also lead to 
negative interpersonal outcomes. To ward off painful self-blame, shame-prone individuals tend to be 
more resentful, suspicious, and accusatory, all of which would make it difficult for individual employees 
experiencing shame to enlist help from their colleagues (Tangney, 1995).  Highly shame-prone 
individuals tend to be more concerned with others’ evaluations of them than with the consequences of 
their actions for others. For example, the shame-proneness scale mentioned above also asks what the 
respondent would do if a co-worker was blamed for his or her mistake.  Highly shame-prone individuals 
say they would be more likely to “keep quiet and avoid the co-worker,” an action that is not likely to win 
many friends.   
Some empirical evidence supports a link between shame and decreased motivation and 
performance. In two samples of Dutch salespersons (Bagozzi, Verbeke & Gavino 2003 and Verbeke & 
Bagozzi 2002), shame was correlated with lower sales.  In both cases, the researchers argued that this 
diminished performance resulted from a tendency to withdraw as a means of protecting the self rather 
than reaching out to make amends, establish connections, and utilize available resources. These 
preliminary findings corroborate our argument that shame-ridden employees will experience low self-
efficacy and will be less likely to take action in order to repair a mistake. Thus, we put forth the following 
proposition—that feelings of shame will have a negative impact on individual motivation and 
performance in the aftermath of failure. 
 
Proposition 2: Feelings of shame following performance failure will be associated with decreased 
employee motivation and performance. 
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The Antecedents of Guilt and Shame 
We propose that features of the work environment can foster more adaptive emotional responses 
to failure (i.e., guilt) over less adaptive emotional responses (i.e., shame). Although most research on the 
relative benefits of guilt over shame has focused on trait guilt- and shame-proneness, guilt (or shame) can 
also be elicited as a state response to an event with similar benefits (or costs; Kugler & Jones 1992). In 
the current section we identify the general antecedents of guilt and shame states (i.e., the cognitive 
appraisals that lead an individual to experience guilt or shame in response to a given event).  In the 
subsequent section, we will elucidate how each of these appraisals corresponds to a specific 
organizational feature in our model. 
An individual’s emotional response to an event is determined by how the individual makes sense 
of or appraises the event (Frijda 1986; James 1884; Lazarus 1991; Roseman 1991; Schachter & Singer 
1962). To identify the types of appraisals that engender guilt and shame, we draw from studies of guilt- 
and shame-proneness (Tangney 1990; Tangney, Wagner, & Gramzow 1989), research that has 
categorized situational antecedents to guilt and shame (Tangney 1992), and a cognitive appraisal theory 
that is especially useful for distinguishing between self-conscious emotions (like guilt and shame) 
(Manstead & Tetlock 1989). Research on guilt- and shame-proneness, which relies on the Self-Conscious 
Affect and Attribution Inventory or, “SCAAI,” and the more commonly used Test of Self-Conscious 
Affect or, “TOSCA,” has categorized the types of appraisals that distinguish between guilt- and shame-
prone individuals (Tangney, Wagner, & Gramzow 1989).  In particular, these distinctions include a 
tendency to make internal, global, and stable attributions for a negative outcome (predictive of shame) or 
external, specific, and unstable attributions for a negative outcome (predictive of guilt; see also Tracy & 
Robins 2006; Woien, Ernst, Patock-Peckham & Nagoshi 2003).  Tangney (1992) added an interpersonal 
component, suggesting that concerns with others’ evaluations (i.e., how my behaviors affect the way other 
people think of me) “are almost exclusively the domain of shame” (p. 206).  Finally, Manstead and 
Tetlock’s (1989) cognitive appraisal theory attempted to distinguish between guilt and shame attributions. 
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Specifically, Manstead and Tetlock suggest that, “[e]pisodes giving rise to shame…were appraised as less 
harmful to others than were guilt episodes” (p. 231). 
Combining these lines of research, we identify three critical appraisals for distinguishing between 
guilt and shame: (1) Perceptions of control - guilt requires believing that one has control over a negative 
outcome, while shame can occur even if one believes s/he had no control over a negative outcome 
(Tangney 1990; Tangney, Wagney & Gramzow 1989; Tracy & Robins 2006; Woien et al., 2003); (2) 
Object specificity - the object of a guilt response tends to be highly specific (e.g., a particular behavior), 
whereas the object of a shame response tends to be a generalized or non-specific aspect of the self (e.g., 
Tangney 1990; Tangney, Wagney & Gramzow 1989; Woien et al., 2003); (3) Negative outcomes for 
others – people tend to feel guilty when they commit a transgression that harms others or affects others’ 
outcomes (an outward-focused attribution; e.g., Manstead & Tetlock 1989), but they feel ashamed when 
they do something that affects others’ evaluations or opinions of them (an inward-focused attribution; 
e.g., Tangney 1992).  
Perceptions of control 
As self-evaluative emotions, guilt and shame require feeling personally responsible for a negative 
event; that is, an individual must make a cognitive appraisal that something about the self—either a 
behavior or some aspect of the self—caused a negative outcome to occur (cf. Benedict 1946).  However, 
one important factor for determining whether an individual will experience guilt is the individual’s 
appraisal of control over that aspect of the self, and, consequently, one’s control over the negative 
outcome (Tracy & Robins 2006; Weiner 1985).  For example, an employee who negotiates a bad deal 
may believe that he is both responsible for the outcome of the negotiation and that he could have done 
something to prevent the poor result; for instance, he could have prepared more beforehand.  When 
people feel guilty for events such as these, they often recall the event by using active phrases, such as, “If 
only I…,” or “I could have…” (Lindsay-Hartz, de Rivera, & Mascolo 1995).  Such attributions imply that 
the actor had some form of control over the event, and thus, a guilt response is predictable.  
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This sense of control is not, however, necessary for a shame response.  Individuals can also feel 
responsible for things they believe they cannot control.  For example, the employee who negotiates a bad 
deal can still feel entirely responsible for the outcome of the negotiation while simultaneously feeling like 
there was nothing she could have done about it; she could feel that her poor performance results from a 
core aspect of her identity: that she is a terrible negotiator. When people feel ashamed (not guilty) about 
an event, they will typically recall it using phrases such as, “That’s just the way I am…,” or “I can’t do 
anything right…” (Lindsay-Hartz, de Rivera, & Mascolo 1995).  Such attributions imply a lack of control 
over the negative outcome because some fixed aspect of the self caused the outcome to occur. 
In fact, attributions of control for negative outcomes are malleable (Diener & Dweck 1980; 
Langer 1975; Roseman, Spindel, & Jose 1990). For example, the phenomenon known as “learned 
helplessness” (Seligman & Maier 1967) refers to making attributions that negative events are external and 
out of one’s control even when such events are in fact controllable (Mowrer 1960; Seligman 1975).  
However, the tendency to make such attributions can be altered through cognitive behavioral therapy 
(CBT), which involves challenging an individual’s appraisal of negative events on this control dimension 
(e.g., Beck 1970). Mueller and Dweck (1988) have shown that attributions of control can also be altered 
through the type of performance feedback that is given and that such appraisals can have lingering 
consequences for future performance.  For example, they found that attributing children’s success in an 
initial task to a fixed aspect of the self (i.e., “You must be really smart”) as opposed to a controllable 
aspect of the self (i.e., “You must have worked really hard”) negatively affected children’s motivation to 
persist in the face of failure.   
Beyond manipulating attributions of controllable versus uncontrollable aspects of the self, other 
researchers have experimentally manipulated whether a particular event is perceived as controllable or 
uncontrollable (e.g., Cohen, Rothbart & Phillips 1976; Sherrod et al. 1977; Wortman 1975).  In a classic 
study by Langer and Saegert (1977), this was done through a commonplace change in participants’ 
surroundings (i.e., whether they completed a task in a crowded or uncrowded grocery store, see also 
Sherrod 1974), and via a typical induction of perceived control in which participants either had or did not 
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have access to relevant information.  Participants in this study felt as if they had less control over their 
environment when they were surrounded by a large number of people; however, they recaptured some 
sense of control when they were provided with information about possible reactions they might have to 
being in a crowded environment. In sum, the attribution of control—a key component of guilt, but not 
shame—is malleable and subject to the influence of one’s environment, which suggests that organizations 
can use principles of job design to influence these appraisals1. 
Object Specificity 
Another important difference between guilt and shame is the specificity of the object thought to 
have caused the negative outcome (Tangney 1991): while the object of a guilt reaction is highly distinct, 
the object of a shame reaction is more global and far-reaching.  People experience guilt when they 
attribute a negative event to a specific behavior; the aversive experience does not generalize to other 
unrelated domains or generate far-reaching self-evaluations (Lewis 1971; Smith, Webster, Parrott & Eyre 
2002; Tracy & Robins 2006). To return to our earlier example of the employee who negotiated a bad deal, 
that employee would feel guilty for his poor performance if he were to appraise his error as a situation- or 
behavior-specific failure (e.g., “I have trouble regulating my emotions when I’m tired. I should have 
gotten more rest.”). Because he attributes his experience to a particular situation, his future performances 
under slightly different circumstances would likely not be negatively affected.  This experience and 
appraisal stands in contrast to shame, where the cause of an aversive outcome is attributed more globally 
to the self, which is why shame can often lead to feelings of self-hatred, isolation, and worthlessness 
(Tracy & Robins 2006). An employee who appraises the negotiation experience as more generally 
representative of his identity or aptitude (“I always get anxious in confrontational situations.”) is not only 
more likely to feel ashamed but is also more likely to avoid negotiating in the future. 
Like attributions of perceived control, attributions of specificity are not fixed. For example, CBT 
(Beck, 1970) can alter the generality of attributions that depressed individuals make following a negative 
event; the goal in such therapy is to move individuals from the notion that “I mess everything up” to the 
appraisal that “this is an isolated incident.” Experimental psychologists have also manipulated global 
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versus specific attributions in the lab. For example, Keltner, Locke, and Audrain (1993) had participants 
who performed poorly on a midterm exam reflect on how they were feeling either “right now in response 
to the exam” or “right now in response to things in general.”   
The flexibility of specificity appraisals has also been demonstrated in research on construal (e.g., 
Trope 1989; Trope & Liberman 2003). Whereas high-level construals focus on how important or 
desirable an outcome is—the “why” of an event—low-level construals focus on feasibility and 
planning—the “how” of an event. In the context of guilt and shame reactions, global attributions (e.g., 
attributions to the self) are considered high-level construals, while specific attributions (e.g., attributions 
to a particular situation or behavior) are considered low-level (Nussbaum, Trope, & Liberman 2003). An 
individual’s construal of a performance failure can be altered by having him focus on the details of how 
the event unfolded instead of its broader meaning. When individuals are encouraged to focus on specific, 
low-level construals for negative events, they evince better problem-solving, self-regulation, and 
performance (Pham & Taylor 1999; Taylor & Schneider 1989; Watkins & Teasdale 2001).   
Further, Williams and Bargh (2008) have demonstrated that construal level may be influenced by 
an individual’s surroundings, including environmental cues of spatial distance or proximity. Participants 
who were primed with physical distance in these studies (by locating two coordinates that were far apart, 
as opposed to close together, on a Cartesian plane) exhibited higher-level construals of events they were 
presented with later in the study than did participants primed with physical closeness.  This malleable 
nature of specificity attributions suggests that targeted job design could shift an individual’s focus from 
the global, high-level implications of a performance failure to the more specific, low-level causes.  
Other-oriented outcomes versus self-oriented distress 
Shame and guilt are both social emotions.  However, the social experiences that elicit guilt over 
shame are very different.  Guilt arises when an individual appraises that his actions caused harm to 
someone else, whereas shame arises when an individual appraises that his actions affected others’ 
evaluations of himself.  Given the opposing focal point of these appraisals—outward-looking for guilt, 
inward-looking for shame—shame tends to be more associated with the public nature of a failure than 
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does guilt (see Smith, Webster, Parrott, & Eyre 2002). We can thus differentiate guilt from shame on a 
third dimension: the social outcomes of a negative event. Returning once again to our earlier example, if 
the unsuccessful negotiator were to construe her performance as costing her co-workers time or money—
an ostensible “offense against the group”—she would likely experience guilt (Ausubel 1955; Zeelenberg 
& Breugelmans 2008). However, if she were to focus instead on what her colleagues must be thinking of 
her for her poor negotiation skills and the possibility that they might reject her—a potential threat to the 
“social self” (Dickerson, Gruenewald, & Kemeny 2004)—she would likely experience shame. 
Other- and self-oriented attributions are unique from attributions of control and attributions of 
specificity because they are not mutually exclusive. Although it is practically impossible to feel both in 
control and out of control at the same time, it is possible to feel that one has both harmed the group and is 
being negatively evaluated by the group simultaneously. For these reasons, an individual who negotiates a 
bad deal may feel guilty for producing a poor outcome for her colleagues and ashamed over what they 
must think of her negotiating skills. Although previous research has indicated this potential for 
individuals to experience both shame and guilt in response to an event (Lewis, 1971), it is unclear 
whether and how the presence of shame might mitigate the positive effects of guilt.  We surmise that 
provided an individual’s attributions of control and specificity are aligned and an individual is relatively 
more focused on the effect of one’s outcomes on the group than one’s standing in the group, a 
constructive guilt response will predominate. 
As with control and specificity, this “social” appraisal dimension can be influenced by contextual 
factors. The more that certain aspects of a situation make an individual aware of and focused on the effect 
of his actions on others, the more likely it is that this individual will experience guilt (cf. Schaumberg & 
Flynn 2012).  For instance, research on charitable fundraising has demonstrated that inducing guilt 
through vivid portrayals of others’ suffering, which elicits “other-oriented empathy” (Tangney, Stuewig, 
& Mashek 2007), can effectively increase donation intentions (Hibbert, Smith, Davies, & Ireland 2007). 
Indeed, recognizing the impact that one’s actions can have on others is considered an important part of the 
development of individual moral judgment: for example, parents might point out to a child, “Look, your 
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sister is crying,” in order to draw a child’s attention to the harm he has caused others (e.g., Lagattuta & 
Thompson 2007).   
Conversely, contextual factors can elicit shame if they are framed so that individuals attend to 
others’ opinions of them and feel more “exposed” to others’ negative evaluations.  For example, parents 
sometimes call attention to a child’s bad behavior by chiding, “You should be ashamed of yourself.” This 
expression gives the child direction about how she should feel about herself, rather than how to appraise 
the effect of her actions or behavior on others (e.g., Kochanska & Thompson 1997).  Competition can 
also induce shame responses: viewing any performance failure as a competitive defeat can further 
heighten the experience of shame so that a defeat affects an individual’s standing in the group (Lewis 
1971).  In sum, one’s focus on self versus other also appears to be malleable, and can therefore be 
influenced by principles of job design that draw an individual’s attention to how her actions affect group 
outcomes more so than her standing among group members.  
The Role of the Work Environment in Promoting Guilt Responses to Failure 
 We have outlined the advantages of a guilt response over a shame response to failure in the 
workplace, as well as the ways in which an individual must appraise a situation in order to experience 
guilt and not shame.  In this section, we explain how organizations can attempt to elicit a guilt response to 
failure from employees. One might assume that organizations could potentially capitalize on the value of 
guilt over shame reactions to failure by simply hiring individuals who are more likely to make attributions 
that lead to feelings of guilt as opposed to shame—that is, individuals who have a high level of guilt-
proneness and a low level of shame-proneness (Tangney 1990).  However, individual differences are not 
the only determinant of an individual’s emotional reaction to failure.  Contextual cues from the 
environment are also important in determining such reactions.  
To be clear, we are defining the “environment” as a set of external cues characteristic of an 
employee’s work setting from which the employee draws information that can be used to interpret each 
new situation. For example, when faced with a performance failure, an employee may wonder, “Does this 
mean I’m bad at my job or that I should have paid more attention during training?”  To interpret the 
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meaning of this event, the focal employee may look to social cues from the environment. For example, he 
or she may surmise, “My co-workers seemed peeved when I left in the middle of the training session.” 
According to Salancik and Pfeffer (1978), “The social environment provides cues which individuals use 
to construct and interpret events. It also provides information about what a person’s attitudes and opinions 
should be” (p. 225).  The employee may also look to structural cues (Blau 1960). For example, he or she 
may think, “This error report form asks specifically about whether I completed the entire training.”  We 
propose that altering the variety of social and structural environmental cues that employees use to make 
attributions for events may alter an employee’s emotional appraisal following a failure.  
There is clear evidence for the effect of the environment on individuals’ cognitions and behaviors 
in the workplace.  Research suggests that employees’ attitudes and behaviors tend to be consistent with 
organizational norms and values (Davis-Blake & Pfeffer 1989), and that organizations can actively shape 
employees’ attitudes and behaviors via organizational culture (Wilkins & Ouchi 1983). Cultural norms 
can influence how individual employees make sense of problems they encounter (Harris, 1994), and how 
they should interpret others’ behavior (Arkin & Duval 1975; McArthur & Post, 1977).  
Of particular relevance to our model, there is prior evidence for the effect of the environment on 
an individual’s attributions, or cognitive appraisals, for failure specifically.  Bitner (1990) explored the 
effects of environmental cues on customers’ attributions for a service failure, particularly their attributions 
of control and stability. Bitner (1990) found that when customers encountered a service failure, the 
physical appearance of the organization affected the attributions they made for the failure.  When the 
organization appeared organized and professional, the customers were less likely to attribute the service 
failure to stable factors—instead, assuming the mistake was limited to a specific, temporary situation.  
They were also less likely to attribute responsibility for the failure to the firm—instead, determining that 
the firm must not have control over the situation. 
In sum, research suggests that environmental cues can alter how individuals react to negative 
events in the workplace.  Specifically, the structure of one’s work environment can shape employees’ 
emotional reactions to performance failure (see also Sheperd, Patzelt & Wolfe 2011).  In this section, we 
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identify features of the work environment that can alter employees’ attributions for a failure in ways that 
elicit guilt.  Our complete model (summarized in Figure 1) indicates that the appraisal process involves 
first identifying an event as a performance failure2. Once the event is encoded as a failure, features of the 
environment will determine how an individual answers the following three questions, which, in turn, 
determine whether she experiences guilt or shame: (1) Could I have done something different to prevent 
the negative event from occurring? (2) Am I focused on a specific maladaptive behavior, or am I focused 
on a global attribute of myself? (3) Did my failure affect the group, or my standing in the group?  If a 
person does not feel she could have controlled the event, cannot identify a specific behavior as having 
triggered the negative event, or views the event as a personal failure that has no effect on others, the event 
will not produce guilt. Alternatively, if the person believes she did not have control over the event 
because of some stable or global aspect of the self, and if she focuses on others’ negative opinions of her 
rather than the effect of an event on others’ outcomes, a person will likely experience a shame reaction 
and may in turn feel hopeless: “I give up; I am terrible at this job.”  
In this section we describe three features of the work environment that together are likely to 
promote a guilt response over a shame response to failure.  We focus on these three features because of 
their relationship to the three attributions that give rise to guilt, which we reviewed earlier.  Specifically, 
guilt responses should be more prevalent in organizations that (1) grant their members autonomy, (2) 
engage with failures and try to understand the specific behaviors that caused them (i.e., by giving specific 
performance feedback), and (3) emphasize communal goals over individual goals. As depicted in Figure 
1, when employees experience performance failure, these three features of the work environment can 
intervene in the emotion regulation process by affecting their appraisal of the event—eliciting either a 
guilt reaction that should positively affect future task motivation and performance, or a shame reaction 
that should negatively affect motivation and performance.  While each of these three organizational 
features has been studied independently, in an organizational setting these features likely do not operate in 
isolation, but coexist and interact with one another.  We are particularly interested in how the combination 
of all three features may impact employees’ discrete emotional responses to failure.   
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Autonomy 
Hackman and Oldham (1976) defined autonomy as “the degree to which the job provides 
substantial freedom, independence, and discretion to the individual in scheduling the work and in 
determining the procedures to be used in carrying it out” (p. 258).  To clarify the concept, Barrick and 
Mount (1993) use the example of an assembly line worker with a highly structured and supervised routine 
(low autonomy) and a salesperson who sets his or her own schedule and is monitored remotely (high 
autonomy) (p. 112).  High-autonomy jobs offer employees some instruction on what they need to 
accomplish and then allow employees the freedom to determine how they will best meet that goal 
(Langred & Moye 2004).  Employees with high levels of autonomy have more flexibility in determining 
their own work schedules and have some level of decision-making power; they do not need to seek 
approval from a supervisor for every decision they make (Hackman 1980).   
 Autonomy clearly relates to the first cognitive appraisal that accounts for whether someone will 
feel guilt in the face of failure: perceived control.  As Davis (1977) explains, autonomy is “the job 
characteristic that gives employees some control over their own affairs” (p. 239).  We argue that a sense 
of autonomy is a necessary precondition for an employee to experience guilt following a performance 
failure.  As discussed in the previous section, an employee can feel responsible for an event and still feel 
that there was nothing he could have done to prevent it—that he had no control over the negative 
outcome.  Without this perception of control, the employee will not feel guilty for the failure.  For 
example, an employee may be responsible for managing a particular client, but have no authorization to 
negotiate with the client over fees.  If the employee were to lose the client as a result of this issue, the 
employee would easily be able to attribute such a loss to the structural circumstances preventing the 
employee from negotiating a more agreeable contract; in his appraisal of the situation, he might think, 
“My hands were tied” and therefore feel no guilt.  However, because shame does not require this 
attribution of control, the negative affect experienced by this employee could still take the form of shame.  
Instead of thinking, “My hands were tied,” the employee could think, “My employer does not trust my 
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decision making, which is why I was not allowed to negotiate the contract.”  Thus, a shame reaction 
remains a possibility when employees lack autonomy, but a guilt reaction should not occur. 
Conversely, employees with high levels of autonomy are more likely to attribute their mistakes to 
their own decisions (“If only I. . .”) than to some external cause (“My employer…”). When employees 
believe they could have prevented a negative event from occurring, they are more likely to experience 
guilt (Lindsay-Hartz, de Rivera, & Mascolo 1995).  Noting this, we propose that autonomy is necessary 
for producing an experience of guilt following a performance failure.  At the same time, attributions of 
control do not eliminate the possibility of experiencing shame.  For example, an employee might think, “I 
had the autonomy to negotiate the contract and I failed because I am generally a bad employee.”  Thus, 
even with high autonomy, an individual may experience shame following a performance failure. 
However, because this attribution of control is not necessary to produce a shame response, autonomy and 
shame should essentially be orthogonal.  This means that greater autonomy should increase the likelihood 
that an employee will experience a guilt response following failure without necessarily increasing the 
likelihood of a shame response. 
 
Proposition 3: Greater autonomy will lead to cognitive appraisals of control over negative events 
that transpire at work, which will increase guilt without necessarily increasing shame following a 
performance failure.  
 
Specificity of Performance Feedback 
Managers tend to be leery of providing negative performance feedback to employees (Fisher 
1979; Ilgen & Knowlton 1980; Larson 1986; 1989).  Instead, common practice may be to “sweep it under 
the rug.”  At the same time, individual employees are motivated to use feedback-seeking strategies that 
minimize the amount of negative feedback they receive (Ashford 1986).  However, this habit prevents 
employees from acknowledging their performance failures and attempting to correct their mistakes 
(Larson 1989).  By ignoring or failing to recognize mistakes, organizations may miss opportunities for 
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improvement in production or the delivery of services. We argue that employers should engage in giving 
negative feedback, but they should offer it in a manner that induces guilt, not shame.  Negative feedback 
is not bad, per se; rather, individuals’ emotional reactions to this feedback can be more or less adaptive. 
Guilt, as we have argued, may be especially adaptive.  
Performance feedback varies in terms of specificity, from general descriptions to precise details. 
General feedback can take the form of an assessment of how employees compare to peers using coarse 
categorizations; specific feedback can take the form of a task-specific response such as “When you do 
____, you should do it more like ____.”  In their meta-analysis of the performance feedback literature, 
Kluger and DeNisi (1996) concluded that feedback specificity was an important moderator in determining 
the effectiveness of feedback interventions for improving performance.  When negative feedback was 
highly task-specific, performance improved following the feedback intervention; when negative feedback 
was more general, performance was subsequently impaired due to a perceived threat to self-esteem.  
Similarly, in their study of performance feedback given to students, Butler and Nisan (1986) found that 
those students who received task-specific feedback were more intrinsically motivated when they resumed 
the task at hand than were students who received feedback about how their performance ranked in 
comparison to their peers and students who received no feedback at all.   
In general, people will experience negative (not positive) affect in response to negative 
performance feedback whether it is specific or not (Illies & Judge 2005), and it is unlikely that feedback 
specificity will lessen the target’s distress. However, based on our review of the situational features that 
elicit guilt over shame, we posit that feedback specificity changes the way employees appraise negative 
feedback situations, and, thus, changes the form of the negative emotion they experience.  Because 
general feedback—“We haven’t been happy with your performance”—appears to reflect on the self, 
generally speaking, rather than a specific behavior, it prompts cognitive appraisals that lead to shame.  
Conversely, negative feedback that focuses on particular actions related to a task or job role—“We 
believe these specific behaviors are problematic because”—reflects a distinct miscue and not a global, 
stable attribute of the self. This more fine-grained, detailed feedback should evoke feelings of guilt.  In 
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sum, highly specific negative performance feedback engenders a more adaptive affective response (guilt) 
over a less adaptive response (shame).   
 
Proposition 4: Specific feedback following a performance failure will lead employees to attribute 
shortcomings to specific behaviors rather than to global attributions of the self; the attribution to 
behavior is necessary for producing a guilt response instead of a shame response following a 
performance failure. 
 
Outcome Interdependence 
We suggest that a guilt response is more likely to follow a performance failure in situations that 
involve higher level of outcome interdependence. Wageman (1995) defines outcome interdependence as 
“the degree to which significant outcomes an individual receives depend on the performance of others” 
(p. 147).  For our purposes, it may be useful to think of outcome interdependence as the degree to which 
significant outcomes one’s coworkers receive depend on one’s own performance.  According to past 
research (e.g., Tangney & Dearing, 2002), experiences of guilt relate to outward-focused rather than 
inward-focused appraisals: that is, employees experience guilt when they perceive that their actions have 
done harm to others, while they experience shame when they perceive that their actions have harmed 
others’ opinions or evaluations of themselves (Tangney 1992).  Although it is foreseeable that an 
employee will be concerned with others’ evaluations of him or her following a mistake, an outward focus 
that directs the individual toward what the mistake means for the group’s outcomes may steer their 
emotional reaction away from shame and toward guilt.   
  Outcome interdependence can be established through various means, including the structure of 
employee reward systems (emphasizing collective-oriented over self-oriented incentives), recognition for 
group instead of individual accomplishments, or an emphasis on group objectives rather than personal 
objectives.  The key to establishing outcome interdependence is the set of environmental cues that 
indicate whether an individual’s performance is valued for its effect on others or its indication of one’s 
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standing in the group.  Outcome interdependence reinforces communal values and emphasizes the effect 
of individual performance on the group (Wageman, 1995). Conversely, outcome independence 
emphasizes individual performance and encourages comparisons and competition between individual 
employees. Independent reward systems highlight an individual’s standing within the group.      
Work environments that emphasize outcome interdependence may elicit different affective 
reactions to failure relative to those that emphasize outcome independence.  In a setting that emphasizes 
outcome interdependence, employees who fail to meet performance expectations know that they are 
adversely affecting both their own outcomes and those of their coworkers. Although an employee’s 
mistake may never be made public to the group, he or she may be reminded of the group’s shared fate by 
various environmental cues (e.g., group photos on the wall or a prominent organizational mission 
statement).  An employee’s failure in such a system is considered a loss to the group, which would likely 
elicit feelings of guilt (Baumeister et al. 1994).  As a result, employees in interdependent outcome 
systems should feel a stronger sense of obligation to correct or make up for their failings and to repair the 
harm they have caused (e.g., Tangney et al. 1996), even if it means working outside the normal schedule 
or on tasks that are not explicitly assigned to them (Barker 1993).  
Conversely, employees that struggle in outcome independent systems may feel more ashamed 
than guilty as they compare their failings with the performance of other individuals in the group (e.g., 
Lewis 1971).  Emphasizing individual excellence over communal goals can take extreme forms: to use a 
notorious example, the corporate culture at Enron zealously rewarded and punished individual 
performance through a system colloquially referred to within the company as “rank and yank,” where 
“stars” were regularly promoted and poached between departments, often to the detriment of the 
organization as a whole (McLean & Elkind 2003).  In such a competitive system that emphasizes 
individual performance above all else, poor performers have no reason to feel guilty—the effect of their 
performance on the group is irrelevant.  However, such an emphasis on competition and individual 
standing would likely induce shame for those who do not measure up (Lewis 1971).  
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Proposition 5: Greater outcome interdependence will lead to cognitive appraisals of how one has 
harmed others (rather than how others view the self) following a performance failure; this 
outward-focused appraisal will increase guilt without increasing shame. 
 
 Thus far, we have described the separate contributions of each feature of our model.  However, it 
is important to note that our model predicts a constructive guilt response to failure only when all three 
levers are properly “adjusted.”  That is, autonomy must be high, performance feedback must be specific, 
and an employee’s performance must have an effect on others.  If any one of these elements is missing in 
a failure situation, it can decrease the likelihood of a guilt response.  For example, an employee who is 
given specific feedback about a poor decision she made that negatively affected group outcomes, but was 
not given the autonomy to have made a different decision by her manager, may feel frustrated, but she is 
unlikely to experience guilt (the decision was out of her control).  Similarly, a salesman with complete 
discretion over how he pitches a product who learns that a specific element of his pitch isn’t working may 
be disappointed with his performance and feel compelled to make a change, but he is unlikely to 
experience guilt if his sales outcomes have no impact on anyone but himself.  Such interdependence 
among these three elements is a key feature of the model.  Although each element (e.g., high autonomy) 
may be associated with its own individual positive employee outcomes, it is the unique combination of 
these three features together that will make guilt a likely response to failure.   
Discussion 
Affective responses to performance failures represent an important topic of inquiry for 
researchers in organizational behavior given that poor service, technical errors, and tardiness are common 
experiences in most workplaces. The model presented here outlines some ways in which organizations 
can structure their environments so that the inevitable negative affective response employees have to 
these kinds of failures is less harmful—and potentially beneficial—to both the employee and the 
organization.  Specifically, we have described the antecedents and consequences associated with guilt, a 
more adaptive response to failure, and contrasted them with the antecedents and consequences associated 
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with shame, a less adaptive response. We have proposed that organizations should provide their 
employees with group goals, afford them autonomy in determining how to reach those goals, and provide 
specific feedback to let them know how they are doing.  When an employee makes a mistake in such an 
environment, which employees inevitably will do, the emotional effects are likely to be mitigated and less 
damaging in terms of performance.  
Theoretical and Practical Contributions 
Many of our recommendations, such as increasing autonomy and giving specific feedback, are 
already considered to be good organizational practices.  However, the assumption behind many of these 
prior recommendations is that such practices are associated with higher levels of positive affect felt by 
individual employees.  For example, according to Hackman and Oldham, desirable job characteristics 
such as autonomy and specific feedback create “a positive self-generated affective ‘kick’” for individual 
workers (p. 60).  The positive affect generated by these job characteristics has, in turn, been linked to a 
number of positive organizational consequences, such as organizational commitment and job satisfaction 
(Isen & Baron 1991; Weiss & Cropanzano 1996), which perpetuates a belief that these characteristics are 
desirable largely because they make employees feel good.     
A major contribution of the current model is to propose that these job characteristics will not 
always make people feel good.  Employees will feel bad when they encounter failure, even when they 
have high autonomy, specific feedback, and interdependent outcomes.  Yet, as we have argued, some 
forms of feeling bad are better than others.  We have identified a subset of desirable job characteristics 
that can shape employees’ negative affective reactions—that is, their likelihood of exhibiting a more 
adaptive (guilt) or a less adaptive (shame) response to failure.  This subset of features does not include all 
desirable job characteristics that are often linked to positive affect. For example, task variety is thought to 
produce positive affective experiences, (e.g., more stimulating work experiences and more positive affect 
toward one’s career; Campion, Cheraskin, & Stevens, 1994). However, based on our review of the 
antecedents of guilt versus shame reactions, which include control, specificity, and other-oriented 
outcomes, task variety, although desirable for other reasons, would not likely affect an employee’s 
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experience of guilt or shame following failure.  Thus, our recommendations are unique in focusing on a 
particular subset of job characteristics that are relevant to guilt and shame, and in suggesting that these job 
characteristics need not make employees feel good in order to be good organizational practices. 
Our model also highlights the role of formal features of the work environment in the regulation of 
employee emotions. Most research on guilt and shame examines either specific features of the 
transgression or the types of reparative behaviors that follow the transgression (e.g., atoning versus 
hiding).  In contrast, our examination of these two discrete emotions emphasizes the malleability of 
emotional responses by outlining the contextual factors that may cause an individual to experience either 
guilt or shame.  Drawing on emotion attribution theories, we propose that specific features of an 
organizational environment affect an individual’s encoding of a personal failure, and, consequently, the 
extent to which the individual feels guilty or ashamed for that failure. This consideration of the role of the 
organizational environment in emotion regulation, particularly as it pertains to guilt and shame responses, 
has not been explored; thus, our model opens up new possibilities for organizations, which can actively 
promote more adaptive responses to failure by establishing reward structures and feedback mechanisms 
that help regulate employees’ emotional reactions to failure.  
Another contribution of our model is the clear case it makes for the importance of studying 
discrete emotions and isolating their distinct dynamics in the workplace. Past research on emotions in 
organizations generally focuses on the broad categories of negative and positive affect, in the process 
lumping together discrete emotions that have similar valence but different antecedents and consequences.  
This often means that shame and guilt are lumped together in a single construct of negatively-valenced 
emotions and not considered separately. Because we are interested in predicting how individuals react to 
specific objects and events, a focus on discrete emotions rather than broad categories of affective 
experience enables us to suggest more tailored approaches to mitigating harmful responses. Simply 
knowing that an employee feels badly upon hearing negative feedback cannot predict the impact that 
feedback will have on the employee’s subsequent behavior and performance—one needs to know 
precisely whether the employee feels guilt or shame, for example, in order to predict their behavior. Our 
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model demonstrates how researchers can draw on general frameworks of emotion in organizations (e.g., 
Elfenbein 2007) to make behavioral predictions for specific discrete emotions. 
Finally, in addition to making a theoretical contribution, our model offers clear practical 
suggestions that can be easily implemented by managers in organizations. Previous research has asserted 
that negative emotions are counterproductive motivational tools (e.g., Edwards 1992; Luthans & Kreitner 
1985). Yet, performance failures are inevitable, and it is unreasonable to suggest that we could—or even 
that we should—eradicate negative affect entirely, particularly in the face of significant failures.  Rather, 
our model can educate employers about how to channel negative affect in more productive ways, for 
example by equipping employees with a sense of control, useful feedback, and a communal spirit that will 
motivate them to rectify a bad situation.  To this end, employers can emphasize features of the work 
environment, namely autonomy, specific performance feedback, and outcome interdependence, that will 
engender feelings of guilt rather than shame.  
Limitations and Future Research Directions 
Individual Differences Related to the Model 
Guilt and shame may be related to several variables that were not incorporated into our model but 
are nonetheless relevant to organizations. For example, cultural values, such as collectivism and 
individualism, have been found to moderate (Bagozzi, Verbeke, & Gavino 2003) and alter (Stipek 1998; 
Wallbott & Scherer 1995) individuals’ experiences of self-conscious emotions, such as shame, guilt, and 
embarrassment. Individuals in collectivistic cultures tend to be more aware of others’ perspectives (Heine, 
Takemoto, Moskalenko, Lasaleta & Henrich 2008) and the extent to which their behaviors affect other 
people (Bohns et al. 2011).  Thus, their appraisals of events may be less affected by environmental 
interventions designed to draw attention to how their actions affect others.  For these reasons, the same 
levers (e.g., increasing outcome interdependence) that may provoke guilt responses in, say, an American 
organization, may not elicit these responses to the same degree when applied to a Chinese organization.  
Further, individual differences in the propensity towards collectivism or individualism (e.g., Moorman & 
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Blakely 1995) may lead individual employees to react differently to changes in these organizational 
features.  
Along a similar vein, individual differences might moderate the predicted relationships put forth 
here.  As a personality variable, conscientiousness may be positively associated with the trait of guilt-
proneness, and negatively associated with shame-proneness.  Conscientiousness correlates with a strong 
sense of personal responsibility (Smith 1967; Wiggins, Blackburn & Hackman 1969) and selflessness 
(Moon 2001). Evidence also suggests that the link between conscientiousness and work performance is 
mediated through many of the same motivational factors that we have argued drive the link between guilt 
and performance in response to failure (Gellatly 1996). For example, highly conscientious individuals set 
high performance goals (Barrick, Mount, & Strauss 1993; Barrick & Mount 1993; Gellatly 1996), and 
demonstrate high performance expectancy (Gellatly 1996; Martocchio & Judge 1997), which we have 
argued is likely to play a role in the link between guilt and work performance. The overlap between 
qualities associated with conscientiousness and qualities associated with guilt suggests that highly 
conscientious individuals may be particularly sensitive to antecedents and experiences of guilt and less 
vulnerable to cognitive appraisals associated with shame.  Despite this potential overlap between 
conscientiousness and guilt, it is worth noting that Flynn and Schaumberg (2012) continued to find 
associations between individual differences in guilt-proneness, motivation, and commitment even when 
controlling for conscientiousness, suggesting that guilt should have an effect on employee outcomes 
above and beyond those of conscientiousness.   
Finally, as mentioned earlier, guilt and shame have also been measured as individual-difference 
variables (Tangney 1990).  Such individual differences in one’s proneness to experiencing guilt or shame 
may interact with various features of our model.  For example, both greater guilt-proneness and greater 
shame-proneness may lower the threshold at which an individual considers a negative outcome to 
constitute a performance failure.  As a result of increased vigilance for potential shame- or guilt-inducing 
events in the environment, an individual who is highly guilt-prone may experience guilt for even the 
smallest transgression, while a person who is highly shame-prone may feel ashamed for an insignificant 
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personal flaw or gaffe.  Thus, individual differences in guilt- and shame-proneness may help determine 
whether our predictions apply more to particular individuals.  Individual differences in guilt-proneness or 
shame- proneness may also affect individuals’ perceptions of the factors in our model across multiple 
environments.  For example, guilt-proneness may be consistently associated with greater perceptions of 
outcome interdependence in any work environment (viewing any work outcome as a group triumph or 
failure), while shame-proneness may have the inverse relationship (viewing any work outcome as a 
personal victory or defeat).  As a result, the effect of structural features in the environment may have less 
influence on individuals who are already highly guilt-prone or shame-prone—that is, the effect of 
individual differences may outweigh the effect of the situation for individuals who fall especially high on 
the guilt- or shame-proneness spectrum (cf., Barrick & Mount 1993).   
Ethical Concerns and the Hidden Complexities of Guilt and Shame 
It is worth noting some cautions and ethical concerns about using any negative emotion as a 
motivational tool. Although guilt may be less destructive than shame, extreme levels of guilt can lead to 
psychological distress, as can an extreme experience of any negative emotion (e.g., O’Connor, Berry & 
Weiss 1999).  Thus, while the experience of guilt may be beneficial in moderate amounts, too much guilt 
can become maladaptive. Moreover, organizations may risk a backlash if individuals feel that people in 
the workplace are intentionally manipulating them by appealing to their guilty consciences, or “guilt-
tripping.” In cases of perceived manipulation, employees may even perform worse on their assigned tasks 
(Brockner, Davy, & Carter 1986). To avoid these negative consequences, we suggest that organizational 
leaders focus not on inducing guilt per se, but on implementing the constructive organizational practices 
(autonomy, specific feedback, and outcome interdependence) we have recommended to create an 
environment in which employees are likely to experience more adaptive emotional responses to failure. In 
short, although we have argued that individual experiences of guilt would be less likely to decrease 
morale than would shame, we do not endorse blatant and extreme attempts to induce feelings of guilt.  
Moreover, we have presented a stark distinction between guilt and shame for illustrative 
purposes, but this distinction does not fully capture all the nuances of these two emotions. There are 
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circumstances in which shame can sometimes be the more adaptive response, just as there are situations 
in which guilt can be debilitating.  For example, it may be appropriate for employees to feel shame for 
violations of ethical transgressions such as stealing. In such a case, feeling shame regarding the perceived 
inconsistency between what someone wants to be (e.g., a “good person”) and what their actions seem to 
say about them (stealing is inconsistent with being a “good person”) forces an individual to look inward at 
his motives and core qualities in ways that can help instigate change. Shame and the anticipation of shame 
have also been shown to serve a self-regulatory function; in the example of stealing, an individual might 
think, “I won’t steal because the shame would be too painful” (Izard 1977).  Shame may also perform a 
group cohesion function by aligning group members’ opinions about what constitutes appropriate 
behavior. Conversely, there are situations in which guilt can be debilitative rather than productive.  For 
example, highly guilt-prone individuals with a strong sense of autonomy may overextend those feelings 
of control and consequently feel responsible for events that are, in fact, beyond their control.  “Survivor’s 
guilt” constitutes one example of such maladaptive guilt: many employees experience this emotion after 
seeing their co-workers get laid off (e.g., Brockner, et al 1986; Chodoff, Friedman, & Hamburg 1964) 
even though they had no control over the layoff decision.  In short, there are some circumstances when 
organizations would want to alleviate employees’ guilt or even allow for experiences of shame. 
Conclusion 
 We have outlined a model for how organizations can shape employees’ affective responses to 
past failure in order to produce more positive results in the future.  Highlighting the distinction between 
the adaptive nature of guilt and the less adaptive nature of shame within social settings, we assert that this 
same distinction is important within the workplace.  Further, we suggest that organizations can play an 
instrumental role in influencing employees’ discrete emotional reactions to the benefit of both employees 
and the organization.  The notion that any form of negative affect can be adaptive may seem 
counterintuitive to the casual reader who is more used to hearing that happy workers are productive 
workers. However, when we account for the unique properties of guilt, we recognize its motivational 
force in prompting employees to take corrective action following past mistakes or in advance of future 
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shortcomings, while shame incites more detrimental effects. 
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Footnotes 
1The literature on self-enhancement suggests that attributing failure to some controllable aspect of the self 
is threatening to one’s ego and would consequently be avoided at all costs. In support of this argument, 
Miller (1976) and Riess and Taylor (1984), among others (see Blaine and Crocker 1993), have found that 
individuals are less likely to take personal responsibility for failures than successes.  This implies that 
people may be inclined to attribute their failures to external events, thereby avoiding the uncomfortable 
experience of guilt altogether. However, other research suggests this is not the case. For example, using 
an experience sampling method, Baumeister and Reis (1995) found that participants who were randomly 
signaled to complete a questionnaire over the course of a week reported feeling at least mildly guilty 
12.7% of the time—an emotional experience as common as anxiety.  Further, guilt was frequently 
associated with performance failures that were directly attributable to the self (e.g., procrastinating). Thus, 
it appears that the motive for self-enhancement may not preclude individuals from taking responsibility 
and experiencing guilt for their mistakes, particularly when they believe that they had some control over 
that negative event. For a more complete perspective on how the self-motives literature, which suggests 
that individuals are more likely to deflect personal responsibility for failure, may be reconciled with the 
literature on self-conscious emotion, which requires that an individual accept personal responsibility for 
failure, see Leary (2007).   
2Note that in order for our model to apply, an event must be significant enough to be judged a 
performance failure by the individual.  Some mistakes are simply not impactful enough to warrant a 
notable affective response (e.g., printing the wrong document may waste paper, but it is not significant 
enough to be a considered a performance failure).  However, there may be individual differences in the 
threshold at which an individual will consider an event a performance failure, which we describe in 
greater detail in the discussion.    
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